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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) approach to intercon-
nected devices has become a significant topic in recent years, and
is likely to be a major influence on future networking standards,
such as ongoing work on 5G. IoT introduces connectivity to
a much wider range of devices than seen previously, which
raises a number of challenges, both technical and ethical. This
paper explores some of these challenges which IoT faces, as a
result of the personal and confidential information which may be
transmitted from body-worn sensors, and the inherent challenges
of introducing connectivity to standalone devices, rather than to
equipment operated by users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a networking paradigm
encompassing ubiquitously connected devices, themselves no
longer tied to a particular human user, which are capable of
interaction with other such devices. IoT-based technologies
are being investigated for health monitoring, smart homes
and device control, vehicles and transportation, and in fixed-
location physical deployments (such as within buildings or on
street furniture) for environmental sensing.
Such diverse use-cases will inevitably encounter chal-
lenges, although we focus here on some specific challenges
pertaining to the networking of such devices on the scales
being considered, and factors to be considered when looking
at carrying out such deployments. According to CISCO, 50
billion devices are expected to be connected to the internet by
2020 [1], raising questions over how connectivity for devices
can be managed and provided. Such a significant rise in
connected devices means significant changes in how we design
and organise networks will be necessary.
IoT device communications can be considered to operate
on one of three models. Firstly, a device might only transmit
when a state-change is observed. For example, a remote
temperature sensor may only transmit when the temperature
changes, or falls outwith a permitted range. These devices will
likely transmit sporadically, and would not necessarily require
constant connectivity to carry out their activities. Of note,
however, is the risk that in the event of an environmental (or
other) change, many such devices may simultaneously attempt
to establish connectivity, to report of a state change, potentially
overwhelming the local access network. Similarly, in the case
of devices on heavily contended access links, not receiving a
status update is not in itself a guarantee of all being well —
the device may be attempting to send a report, but may be
unable to obtain reliable connectivity.
Secondly (to address the concern of this ambiguous radio
silence), devices could be configured to report data on a
scheduled basis. These devices will therefore only require
connectivity at predictable periods, and the demand from these
devices may be balanced. Means of automatically balancing
this load (perhaps by allowing adjacent devices to observe
patterns of usage, and select a period of relatively low activity
for their own transmissions) offer a practical way to reduce
the risk of connectivity problems. A hybrid of scheduled and
conditional data transmission could be used, where abnormal
conditions may be reported immediately, but regular data
would only be reported on a scheduled basis. As such, a missed
report may be detected and acted upon.
Finally, devices may also be designed to hold a constant
connection to the internet, such that they may have their
state queried in real-time, or receive (and react to) incoming
requests. The requirement of a specific device will naturally
define the connectivity mode, although requiring persistent
inbound connectivity will require that the device remain as-
sociated with the access network at all times. If a network
has a limit to the number of associated devices permitted
(such as WiFi), this may pose a practical challenge during
implementation.
Previous work has explored challenges of IoT [2], [3],
although the majority of this work has focused on the the
security aspects of IoT. In this extended abstract, we explore
the challenges of achieving connectivity for IoT devices,
which are inherently non-user oriented. We also explore some
security and privacy considerations, relating specifically to the
use of networked devices lacking human-in-the-loop input.
II. DEPLOYMENT OF IOT DEVICES
When considering IoT deployments, the conventional
model of services being consumed by users is no longer
necessarily strictly accurate. Nonetheless, we shall consider
that a connected device is, for our purposes, a user just like any
other human user. Establishing quality-of-service guidelines
to prioritise traffic of human users may well prove to be
a stop-gap approach to prevent perceivable service quality
degradation.
A. Cellular vs WiFi Connectivity
The number of users a mobile cell may sustain depends
on the available bandwidth and resource blocks for the cell,
and the quantities of data being transferred by users [4].
Cell types such as macrocells, femtocells and picocells play
an important part in future IoT device connectivity. Based
on the cell type and the number of users in the current
cell, the ability to connect may be limited, particularly for
larger cells. For a typical LTE macrocell, up to 300 users
may be accommodated within a cell and have connectivity
to the network [5]. Introducing new IoT devices, in addition
to existing human users, may significantly raise the number of
devices demanding connectivity within busy cells. This would
result in increased traffic over the network.
Ongoing research into the specification and development of
5G will likely need to address the challenge of allocating lim-
ited resources to both mobile users and connected IoT devices.
While upgrades to previous generation networks considered
headline data speeds, we believe that priority should be given
to increasing the number of users able to connect per cell,
perhaps by reducing cell size, or implementing and deploying
seamless hand-off between WiFi and cellular connections (to
reduce the number of users dependent on one cell).
An alternative approach is to utilise existing WiFi networks
for connected devices where possible. There are, however,
also limitations on the number of WiFi users that can use
the network per access point. Typically for a consumer-grade
home wireless router, up to 10 users [6] can simultaneously
use it. An enterprise access point featuring 2x2 MIMO can
likely sustain up to 60 users [6].
When considering use of WiFi connectivity however, some
extra considerations arise. While it is straightforward to con-
nect a device to a single wireless network, the challenge of
deploying access credentials for multiple networks, to multiple
devices, is a very real one. To make WiFi conenctivity viable
for connected devices, an out-of-band means of issuing new
tokens to a disconnected device would be highly desireable,
to avoid the need for manual intervention to install new keys
on the device.
Similarly, however, the need to deploy SIM cards in
cellular-connected devices may prove to be a challenge for
implementations — each device requires its own SIM card,
and changing cellular network would require a new SIM card
to be installed on each device. Alternative means of handling
the exchange of currently SIM-based subscriber information
may be desirable, to remove the risk of expensive manual
intervention being required on large numbers of deployed
device.
Another approach is the aggregation of data from several
IoT devices in a local concentrator (which has various means
of connectivity available), which then relays these messages
over its own links. While this does not resolve the challenge
of wireless spectrum usage by the devices in a local setting,
it would remove many of the challenges of deploying creden-
tials to connected devices, if only the concentrator required
updating. Wireless communication between devices and the
concentrator would be over a much shorter distance however
(akin to current domestic WiFi deployments), allowing for
locally managed network access controls.
The cost of deploying cellular connectivity for these de-
vices has to be considered by both vendors and end-users.
Local data aggregation would help minimise the number
of devices connected to a mobile network, although would
increase the quantity of data transferred by each concentrator.
When considering cellular or WiFi connectivity of IoT
devices, the relative mobility of devices should also be taken
into account. Some devices operate in an inherently more fixed
manner than others. For example, a climate sensor mounted on
an item of street furniture (such as a lamp post) is much less
likely to be mobile than an air pollution sensor located on a
car-pool vehicle. Mobile devices will require more versatile
and rapid hand-overs, compared to fixed devices (which may
only need to handover in the event of a failure of a local access
point). Devices requiring regular handovers will lead to greater
resource usage on cellular networks.
B. Power consumption
Power consumption also needs to be considered when
planning for deployments of connected devices. Aiming to
utilise network capacity during off-peak periods would be one
potential solution to reduce power consumption of IoT devices,
as there would be less waiting required for a transmission slot,
and less risk of collisions when attempting to associate with
the network. It may not however always be practical to transmit
during off-peak times, and if connected devices were to form
the bulk of traffic, formerly off-peak periods may well become
highly contended.
The distance of devices from the network base station is
a significant consideration for connected device power con-
sumption. For this reason, we believe that a focus on reducing
cell size, and therefore maximum transmission distance, is an
important consideration in the development of the 5G standard,
and in planning for connected device deployments.
C. Resilience
It is possible that some deployments of connected devices
will wish to ensure connectivity is sustained, even in the
event of a failure of a local network. For example, in the
event of a WiFi outage, or a power cut disrupting power to
a local relaying device, the user may wish to ensure continued
connectivity, at the expense of increased power usage, if the
nature of the deployment demands that data continue to be
available.
A key factor in resilience of connected devices (in addi-
tional to typical physical considerations, such as housing and
protection against weather and abuse) will include the ability
for the device to connect to new networks, or to select the most
reliable network available. There are inherent considerations
here for network providers, since users may wish to have the
ability to migrate devices to a different network provider, if
one proves unreliable, or a rival offers enhanced connectivity.
Likewise, large deployments may wish to reduce their access
costs by relaying data via concentrators (as discussed in
Section II-A, or by prioritising local networks (such as WiFi)
above cellular networks. This may open up new opportunities
for one-providers connectivity solutions, offering both WiFi
and cellular connectivity for devices using a single provider,
or for marketplace-based approaches to connectivity [7], where
IoT device providers may negotiate bandwidth and access at
scale in an open, competitive marketplace.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY
A device-oriented approach to networks, as opposed to
the conventional user-oriented approach, presents a number of
security and privacy considerations.
A. Security
Conventional security software and practices were often
developed with the assumption that a user would be physically
present at the system, in order to act as the decision-maker
in the event of a question affecting data security. With an
IoT-based device, where the device is no longer tied to an
individual, with no human physically present, this model of
security is no longer practical. For example, where a regular
internet browser would prompt the user upon connection to
a server with an invalid or expired SSL certificate, this is
obviously not possible when considering user-less systems.
Previous work [8] has demonstrated the extreme risks of
non-browser SSL certificate verification, and the extent to
which widely deployed and relied-upon libraries and software
failed to properly validate certificates. Without addressing
these complexity issues, the security of data (and any remote
updates) of IoT devices remains an open question.
As discussed in Section II-A, the secure distribution of
access credentials for WiFi networks, and the management
and issuance of SIM cards containing cellular network access
credentials also pose a challenge for device operators. These
form a security challenge as well, in that the secure bootstrap-
ping of new devices may be a significant challenge — without
out-the-box connectivity available to a device, provisioning of
secure connectivity (and the secure exchange of access keys)
will pose a significant challenge to device deployment.
B. Privacy
The concept of privacy in a device-oriented device is
a new consideration (from the perspective of transmissions
originating from the IoT device), although privacy is a long-
established principle in the literature. Privacy, in this context
referring to an individual’s right and ability to control their
personal or identifying information, ultimately refers to data
belonging to an individual.
If an IoT device were to be designed (or maliciously
modified, perhaps via an unauthorized firmware update) to
monitor its network interfaces, and report on the identifiers
of other devices, it would be possible for a network of IoT
devices to become pervasive user-trackers. Previous works
have considered these risks, within the context of traditional
networks [9], although connected devices raise the risks of
such tracking. Indeed, some of the proposals made in this work
(from 2007) first saw wide deployment only recently, with
Apple’s launch of iOS 8 [10]. Even then, these anti-tracking
features are only partially effective, with the device’s original
MAC address being restored when the device is in use. The
technique of randomizing MAC address for scanning, when
in the presence of pervasive networked devices, would likely
become ineffective, given the ease with which addresses could
be correlated as users make use of their devices.
C. Message Authentication
In order to prevent the introduction of invalid messages
(for example, from a false sensor, or a device purporting to
be a sensor), it is necessary for consumers of sensor data to
verify the authenticity of readings and other communications
received over any public or shared channel, such as wireless.
The two key factors in verifying the authenticity of the message
are the identity of the sending sensor node (via some form
of device identifier or sensor number), and the integrity (and
thus authenticity) of the data transmitted. This would be
carried out using a digital signature or other data authentication
mechanism. A more detailed discussion of specific protocols
and techniques for sensor security is presented in [11].
Within conventional cellular networks, the concept of iden-
tity is managed by the Subscriber Identity Module (commonly
known as a SIM card), as discussed in Section II-A. One key
consideration here though, is that since SIMs are issued by the
network operator, for use in connecting to their own network,
the SIM-based identity of a wireless device (referred to as its
IMSI) will change upon switching to a new network. There-
fore, it is necessary to identify a sensor device using a hardware
identifier (akin to the IMEI of cellular user equipment). In
the past, IMEI identifiers have often suffered from spoofing,
whereby they are cloned or altered. Therefore, we propose that
strong authentication of device identity should be carried out,
through the use of asymmetric keys. All data transmitted by
a trusted sensor should be signed using a hardware-specific
private key, allowing for its origin (the public key identity)
to be verified. A malicious party wishing to present false
data to the sensor network would therefore need to physically
compromise the original sensor, exfiltrating the private keys,
to generate correctly-signed future messages.
One further authentication challenge which is especially
significant in wireless networks, is that of replay attacks. While
a message may indeed present itself as originating from a
valid sensor node on the network, and its contents may also be
correctly signed to prove the authenticity of the data contained
within, it may be an outdated message which is no longer
relevant. When sensing critical data, a malicious party may
intercept and store valid sensor readings from a time when
sensor readings give no cause for concern, then re-transmit
these during a time of elevated readings (in order to mask the
problem). It is therefore essential to ensure that packets cannot
successfully be replayed by an attacker with transmission
capabilities, using a technique such as that discussed in [12].
More generically, each sensor reading should be authenticated,
and contain a message counter field. Every message should
increment the counter field, and the recipient should store the
last received message counter value. In the event of a malicious
party attempting to replay old readings, the decrease in counter
would be visible, and an alert could be triggered to indicate the
(unsuccessful) attempt to present fake readings. The ability to
carry out a successful replay attack, however, depends upon the
ability for an attacker to block the reception of the valid sensor
readings, and transmit their own, which will be discussed in
the next section.
IV. CONCLUSION
IoT devices face a number of challenges, in pursuit of
the goal of universal connectivity for their devices, which this
extended abstract has explored. Key challenges include those
of network capacity, and the cost of cellular network access
(and the impact this may have on human subscribers), as well
as power consumption, and the trade-offs between the use of
mobile cellular networks, and fixed WiFi networks. A number
of challenges with regard to security and privacy were also
considered, specifically around the lack of a human user in-
the-loop to make decisions on security issues, and the privacy
implications of widespread sensor deployments with wireless
network interfaces. We also introduced some proposals to
resolve some of these challenges.
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